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Abstract. Systems of systems (SoS) are a hot topic in our “fully connected global world”. Our 
aim is not to provide another definition of what SoS are, but rather to focus on the adequacy of 
reusing standard system architecting techniques within this approach in order to improve 
performance, fault detection and safety issues in large-scale coupled systems that definitely 
qualify as SoS, whatever the definition is. A key issue will be to secure the availability of the 
services provided by the SoS despite the evolution of the various systems composing the SoS. 
We will also tackle contracting issues and responsibility transfers, as they should be addressed to 
ensure the expected behavior of the SoS whilst the various independently contracted systems 
evolve asynchronously. 
Introduction 
Systems of systems (SoS) can be defined loosely as a combination of systems in order to 
fulfill some kind of capability, with the additional fact that the composing systems should have 
operational and managerial independence. We will not delve into the current debate of looking 
for the appropriate definition, since our aim is to start from a real-world generic example and 
address concrete issues, which can be used later to feed the current debate. 
Henceforth we will deal with several systems that already provide services to their 
customers/users, and that are coupled with some new structure – which we dare to call a SoS – 
that provides new (emergent) services to the customers/users. The coupling creates added value 
on the one hand, as new services are available, but it increases the appearance of failure modes 
within the whole chain value on the other hand. 
This situation is more and more likely to occur, as multinational cooperation is necessary to 
efficiently handle either major crisis, prevent disasters or just simply make a better usage of the 
natural resources. In this way, system of systems engineering can be seen as a tool to serve the 
Earth! 
We will show that a straightforward extension of the standard functional dependence 
coupling matrix can be used to provide adequate answers. 
Definitions: coupling matrix and system of systems 
A key driver to understanding the non-triviality of the current debate on SoS is that, 
following the generally accepted definition, a system delivers products and/or services. Hence 
the combination of systems gives birth to a tangle of products and services, which justifies the 
search for an encompassing concept but adds to the general confusion. The merging of tangible 
and immaterial value creating entities actually contributes to the complexity of the resulting 
structure. 
 
Among the popular definitions of SoS, Mark Maier’s definition [MAI98b] underlines the 
following properties: 
• Operational independence of the elements: if the SoS is disassembled into its component 
systems the component systems must be able to operate independently in an efficient way. 
The SoS is composed of systems which are independent and useful in their own right. 
• Managerial independence of the elements: the component systems not only can operate 
independently, they do operate independently. The component systems are acquired and 
integrated separately but maintain a continuing operational existence independent of the 
SoS. 
• Evolutionary development: the SoS does not appear fully formed. Its development and 
existence is evolutionary with functions and purposes added, removed, and modified with 
experience. 
• Emergent behavior: the system performs functions and carries out purposes that do not 
reside in any component system. These behaviors are emergent properties of the entire 
SoS and cannot be claimed by any component system. The principal purposes of the SoS 
are fulfilled by these behaviors. 
• Geographic distribution: the geographic extent of the component systems is large. Large 
is a nebulous and relative concept as communication capabilities increase, but at a 
minimum it means that the components can readily exchange only information and not 
substantial quantities of mass or energy. 
 
Our approach to managing the creation of value obtained through the combination of systems 
is to adopt a service-oriented picture, and adapt current “product-driven” system engineering 
tools and use them as “service-driven” SoS engineering tools. Indeed when combining systems 
for which products are exchanged, consumed, or transformed, the resulting added value is a 
priori not greater than the sum of all added values of the component systems. However when 
considering services (which are immaterial, can be composed, and have added-value for the 
consumer and the provider in a predefined context of use – cf. ISO/CEI20000) the story changes. 
Collaboration between service-providing systems allows realizing higher-level services which 
contribute to the added value of the target SoS. Henceforth in the sequel, we will mainly discuss 
services and relegate products to the background. 
 
The engineering tool used extensively in this paper is the N² dependence coupling matrix 
[MEI98, MEI02]. It is used to combine the components into sub-systems, including the 
communication means. One aims at obtaining sub-systems with a strong/high internal cohesion 
and a loose external coupling. 
In our context of SoS, the components are systems. The connections/links/interfaces vehicle 
combinations of products and services. Such combinations can be either sequential or more 
complex (parallel, braiding…) combinations. By identifying dependence and collaboration 
between these service-providing systems, one wants to enhance and preserve the added value of 
the target SoS and to manage the configuration of the latter. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the former notions with an example applied to functional flows. On the 
left side the coupling between four systems (S1, S2, S3 and S4) is represented by a flow diagram. 
The right side shows the corresponding coupling matrix. 
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 Figure 1. Coupled systems and the resulting coupling matrix. 
The systems building up the SoS lie on the diagonal of the coupling matrix, whereas the flow 
exchanged between a source component i and a target component j of the SoS lies on the 
corresponding (i,j) cell (the row corresponds to the source component while the column is the 
target component).  
As an additional feature, we can associate to each cell various information, such as the 
necessary resources in order to fulfill the relevant service, or critical parameters/constraints to 
take into account for the safety or the nominal functioning of the systems. Actually this 
additional information can be organized so as to yield various architecture views of the SoS, 
similar to what is commonly done by system architects. 
Furthermore, we will detail how it is possible to use this matrix to depict dependencies other 
than flows such as physical interfaces, contractual management or legal rules.  
 
One of the advantages of this representation is to yield an easy way to read emerging 
functions and services: if there is a path – or a set of paths – leading from a source cell (s,s) to a 
target cell (t,t), i.e. a chain of dependencies [(s,s),(s,i1),(i1,i2),…,(in,t),(t,t)], then the combination 
(sequential, parallel, etc.) of all that services defines a new service, that can be denoted as 
emerging since it was not foreseen initially. It can be defined informally in natural language, as 
can be seen from the example below, but more interestingly it can be defined formally when one 
looks at the associated resources and when one knows how to compose formally the services. 
We will not detail any formal technique in this paper that can be used to define 
compositionally the emerging services, but they are similar to what is used in process calculus 
(e.g. Milner’s pi-calculus [MIL99]) in mobile communication theory. Furthermore, formal 
verification techniques can be defined that rely on particular logics, like linear logic (cf. Girard’s 
and Lafont’s work on linear logic proof nets [Abrusci 95]), that take resource consumption into 
account. This shows how the seemingly trivial representation above can be used extensively 
throughout the design and verification processes within the engineering of the SoS. 
Context and case study 
Context 
We will use below a case study to explain these concepts and to elaborate the functional 
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dependence coupling matrix. This case study is based upon a fire emergency situation, extracted 
from the Press file “Protect forests against fires” [DDSC 07]. 
The scenario deals with a forest fire in a mountainous area. Various fire fighting devices can 
be used, depending on the geographical location, dwelling proximity, weather and weather 
evolution, and availability of aerial crews and ground squads. 
Integration of systems provides new capabilities to the whole SoS. These new capabilities 
which lead to improved global performance are: 
• optimization of firefighting resources, 
• reduction of the response time to the initial outbreak which prevents fire from spreading to 
a conflagration out of control and thus saves lives, wildlife and natural resources. 
During the "warning" stage of firefighting, the departmental operation center continuously 
updates the fire risk assessment for the concerned areas. The departmental operation center 
prepositions resources according to the fire risk. Early warning is raised as soon as aerial watch 
and ground watch detect any fire start. 
At this point of time, different scenarios can occur. Let us consider the case where an 
unpredictable expansion of the fire is caused by exceptional weather conditions and requires 
additional forces. Those additional forces are coming from foreign firefighting forces. 
Our assumption is that both national command chains are deployed. Different possible 
scenarios can be considered for the coordination that can be qualified using the OIM 
(Organizational Interoperability Maturity model) scale, ranging from 0 (Independent) to 4 
(Unified) [CLARK99]. In the case of our illustration of highly interacting systems, we want to 
achieve level 3 (Integrated) that means that: 
• the integrated level of organizational interoperability is one where there are shared value 
systems and shared goals,  
• a common understanding and a preparedness to interoperate, for example, detailed 
doctrine is in place and there is significant experience in using it. 
• the frameworks are in place and practiced however there are still residual attachments to 
a home organization. 
 
Disclaimer: The following is only a case illustration of coupling component systems towards 
systems of systems. This picture is intentionally simplified for our purpose.  
 
Description of the fire emergency System of Systems 
 
The emergency operation command center (1 – Figure 2) is an ad hoc organization that 
controls the whole fire means and: 
[1.1]: establishes the top priority to mobile headquarter, 
[1.2]: requests additional means and necessary actions to the departmental operation center, 
[1.3]: informs mobile head quarter about situational evolution, 
[1.4]: provides the departmental operation center with information regarding operation in 
progress as well as evolution of situation. 
 
 
The mobile headquarter (2 - Figure 2) is positioned near the disaster and moves regularly on 
the ground at a security range from the fire. The mobile HQ is the nerve center of the system:  
[2.1]: reports the fire status to the emergency operation command center, 
[2.2]: decides tactic of fight to adopt by the ground firefighter squad, 
[2.3]: requests resources to the departmental operation center,  
[2.4]: coordinates (by voice and radio) both the water bombers and the groups of firefighters 
present on the ground (preventing them from aerial droppings). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Operational view of the Emergency Firefighting System (EFS). 
 
The air officer (3 – Figure 2): 
[3.1]: provides assistance to the commander and the coordination plane regarding the air 
means, 
[3.2]: controls the water bombers and assigns them their missions. 
 
The departmental operation center (4 – Figure 2): 
[4.1]: manages the local and national resources made available to the departmental service of 
fire and emergency,  
[4.2]: delivers to the ground firefighter squads the evacuation order for the population, 
[4.3]: orders engagement of additional means: firemen, foresters sappers, units soldiers and 
air means necessary to the execution of the operation, this is external interface outside the 
scope of this issue, 
[4.4]: provides mobile HQ with all information regarding the actual resources, position of the 
active hearths and the fire line, localization of the “significant” points (dwellings, camp-
site…). 
 
The command helicopter (5 – Figure 2) hovering with the top of the flames: 
[5.1]: delivers a global vision of the disaster to the mobile headquarter, 
[5.2]: is used to mark the objectives which the water bomber planes must reach, to the mobile 
headquarter. 
 
The coordination plane (6 – Figure 2), watching at 1,500 feet above the fire area: 
[6.1]: manages the coordination and the safety of the various planes in real time,  
[6.2]: indicates to the water bombers pilots the obstacles, like high voltage lines, to carry out 
their droppings, 
[6.3]: provides air officer with air traffic information. 
 
 
The ground firefighter squads (7 – Figure 2): 
[7.1]: report fire situation to mobile HQ.  
 
The weather team (8 – Figure 2): 
[8.1]: gathers data from national weather forecast services, the network of the automatic 
stations, the weather mobile cases, results of sample analysis, etc., this is external interface 
outside the scope of this issue, 
[8.2]: provides the departmental operation center, the emergency operation command center, 
the air officer and the water bombers with weather data. 
 
The water bombers (9 – Figure 2): 
[9.1]: report the water-drops in real-time to the mobile headquarter, 
[9.2]: report the environmental information to the air officer. 
 
Resulting coupling matrix 
The previous description is easily translated into the following coupling matrix. 
This matrix allows verifying loops of interactions between systems (e.g. servo control) and the 
source and pit of information. In the case of the coordination plane, it gets information from 
environment to elaborate and to distribute situation picture. It’s a source, without system input. It 
is the same situation for the weather team.  
 
Table 1: Coupling matrix for the EFS scenario. 
1 [1.1], [1.3]  [1.2] , [1.4]      
[2.1] 2  [2.3]   [2.2] , [2.4]  [2.4] 
 [3.1] 3   [3.1]   [3.2] 
 [4.4]  4   [4.2] , [4.3]   
 [5.1] , [5.2]   5     
  [6.3]   6   [6.1] , [6.2]
 [7.1]     7   
[8.2]  [8.2] [8.2]    8 [8.2] 
 [9.1] [9.2]      9 
 
When some fire fighter resources coming from various different countries intervene together, the 
matrix becomes more complex. In this case, there are n² configurations, with n equal le number 
of countries intervening. 
The following table shows three SoS intervening. The departmental operation center manages 
the local and national resources made available to the departmental service of fire and 
emergency. Mobile head quarters share information. Air officers exchange information about air 
traffic management. Ground firefighter squads coordinate themselves smoothly. 
   
 
1          1         1       
 2          2         2      
  3          3          3      
   4         4         4      
    5         5        5     
     6         6        6    
      7         7        7   
       8         8        8  
        9          9         9
 SoS country A  SoS country B  SoS country C 
[4.1] 
 
Figure 3. SoS interoperability in the case of multinational intervention. 
 
Direct communication between ground forces requires that firefighters speak a common 
language. If it is so they can coordinate themselves, accurately, without problem. If they don’t 
speak a common language (English for instance), it is necessary to define a liaison agent, 
interface between two groups. This liaison agent can insure both horizontal and vertical 
operability. 
Dependence matrix: compatibility and interoperability issues 
Since the SoS consists of several interconnected systems which have been designed a priori 
without knowledge of each other, the various assumptions about the external world of each 
system may conflict, leading to compatibility problems (e.g. incompatible frequency plans of 
transmitters used in a water bomber and ground teams). These are special cases of 
interoperability issues, which are crucial to allow any service exchange between technical 
systems. Interoperability is not restricted to the existence of physical links between the systems. 
It occurs at various levels; for instance, NATO defines three levels of interoperability for 
military systems: 
• Physical interoperability: a communication link must exist. This link can be wired or 
wireless, and is not necessarily IT-based, e.g. voice can be used as a communication 
medium. 
• Procedural interoperability: a protocol and a syntactical form must be known and used for 
exchange. 
• Operational interoperability: it refers to the activities related to the operation of a system 
in the context of other systems, e.g. doctrine governing the way the system is used. We 
differentiate the IT side of the operational interoperability (semantic interoperability 
between services) and the user side, i.e. how he understands information (sense-making 
and shared situational awareness) [EBR03], [SAS06], [WAR04].   
 
An obvious solution for interoperability is to define an interface for each pair of 
communicating systems. However this can be achieved only for a small-scale system of systems, 
since for a large one, the number of interfaces necessarily leads to a very high cost, when 
feasible. 
   
Figure 4. Common infrastructure decreases complexity. 
 
Other solutions have to be put in place for interoperability, e.g.: 
• Usage of a common technical infrastructure for physical interoperability: in that case the 
systems are no longer peer-to-peer linked, but each one is linked to the infrastructure. 
• Usage of a common service-oriented infrastructure for procedural interoperability: this 
constitutes the current paradigm for information or IT-driven systems, and leads to 
service-oriented architectures. A “service repository” is expected to facilitate loosen the 
coupling between systems. It is empty when created and knows neither providers nor 
consumers. The service-providing systems access the repository to store the service 
definition in a neutral representation (location of the access point to invoke the service, 
service parameters, and quality of service). The service-consuming systems access the 
repository to get a service according to their need, and the invocation of the relevant 
service is then performed. This service repository plays the role of mediator and third 
party, and therefore enhances the security of the system by masking the service provider 
to the service consumer. 
• Semantic issues for operational interoperability are more complex and not fully mature 
within the IT domain. They rely on the definition of common dictionaries (called “meta-
data registry” in the US literature and “pivot model” in French) which are widely used for 
information systems and provide a public data model that allows communication between 
the different systems. 
This multifaceted infrastructure which ensures general interoperability has to be included 
within the SoS as a new component with specific couplings with the relevant systems, and it has 
obviously its own life-cycle: in particular an adequate configuration management should be 
performed. Indeed a common infrastructure facilitates the architecture of the SoS at a given time, 
but not on the longer term: there is a necessary trade-off between immediate added facility 
(which increases short-term agility) and increased configuration management in time. 
 
Coming back to our case study, the following table uses the coupling matrix and focuses on 
exchange and compatibility of services (which are mainly data in our case), indicating the 
versions of the exchanged services (service version on provider side, infrastructures version, 
service version on client side). This means that the system is currently running with the set of 
service versions. From this matrix it is straightforward to see the compliance requirements for a 
service: just look at the column to which the given service pertains. In the case of a system 
consuming services from several independent provider systems, the former must be compatible 
with all the interfaces of the latter through service version adaptation. For instance, the mobile 
HQ must receive information from quite all other elementary systems. Hence mobile HQ needs 
to have the necessary adapters to translate the incoming data into its proper data model. 
 
Table 2: Services and information, exchange and compatibility between systems. 
1 [1.1] / 
(1.6/4.3/2.2) 
[1.3] / 
(3.2/5.2/2.0)  
 [1.2], (././.) 
[1.4], (././.) 
     
[2.1], (././.) 2  [2.3], (././.)   [2.2], (././.)  
[2.4], (././.) 
 [2.4], (././.)
 [3.1], (././.) 3   [3.1], (././.)   [3.2], (././.)
 [4.4], (././.)  4   [4.2], (././.) 
[4.3], (././.) 
  
 [5.1], (././.)  
[5.2], (././.) 
  5     
  [6.3], (././.)   6   [6.1], (././.) 
[6.2], (././.)
 [7.1], (././.)     7   
[8.2], (././.)  [8.2], (././.) [8.2], (././.)    8 [8.2], (././.)
 [9.1], (././.) [9.2], (././.)      9 
 
In above table, the first gray cell indicates the versions 1.6, 4.3 and 2.2 of the [1.1] exchange and 
versions 3.2, 5.2 and 2.0 of the [1.3] exchange, respectively for provider, infrastructure and client 
sides. Other cells of the table are not valued; the version numbers are replaced with dots.     
Managerial independence, system’s owner and manager 
issues 
While the coupling of systems provides new capabilities and services, managerial 
independence of elements of the SoS means that each system is managed independently, 
including the evolution of the provided services, or the updating of data flows and interfaces. 
Each system evolves apart, depending on its owner’s or manager’s goals, needs and means. On 
the other hand, systems may operate for a long time. For instance, a Fire Brigade may delay the 
update of the communication systems embedded in a truck for budget reasons. Such 
asynchronous evolution issues are critical at the SoS level. 
 
The coupling matrix provides a helpful insight to tackle such issues. Let us illustrate that on 
the EFS scenario. Table 3 lists the various systems’ owners and managers. 
 
Table 3: Systems’ owners and providers. 
 Emergency 
Operation 
Command 
Center (1) 
Mobile 
Head 
Quarter 
(2),  
Air 
0fficer (3) 
Depart-
mental 
Operation 
Center (4) 
Command 
Helicopter 
(5) 
Coordi-
nation 
plane 
(6) 
 
Ground 
firefighter 
squads (7) 
 
Weather  
team (8) 
 
Water 
bomber 
(9) 
O
w
ne
r 
Fire brigade Fire 
Brigade 
Civil Air 
Traffic 
Mana-
gement 
Office 
Local Civil 
Authority 
Fire Brigade Fire 
Brigade 
Fire Brigade Local Civil 
Authority 
Homeland 
security 
agency 
(nation A) 
Pr
ov
id
er
 
Industrial 
company 
(Civil 
Security 
System Inc.) 
Industrial 
company 
(C3I Ltd.)
Industrial 
company 
(ATM 
Gmbh. 
Industrial 
company 
(Civil 
Security 
System Inc.) 
Helicopter 
manu-
facturer 
(Heli Corp.) 
Aircraft 
manu-
facturer 
(Nice 
Plane 
Ltd.) 
Manu-
facturers 
(Teleco SA, 
Truck 
Gmbh., 
Incendio 
Vestiti 
S.p.A.) 
Industrial 
company 
(Frog SA) 
Aircraft 
manu-
facturer 
(Shower 
Plane Ltd.)
 
 
In addition to their variety, it should be noted that the systems themselves are part of 
different SoS. For instance, each plane manufacturer manages its transmission systems with its 
suppliers. This concerns the type of data, their semantic, syntax and format. 
Moreover, the evolution of the mobile HQ system may be the result of economic constraints. 
If the mobile HQ system provider updates the system, what are the impacts of this updating upon 
the interfaces with the other systems? Do these impacts necessarily imply evolution of the other 
related systems? 
 
The coupling matrix helps answering such questions: if we read it as a process dependency 
matrix, the presence of many non-diagonal terms emphasizes tight coupling. On the contrary, a 
sparse matrix means a weak coupling. Thus the coupling matrix visually identifies sets of 
component systems whose collaboration is both essential and complex for the achievement of the 
emerging services. One of several possible SoS architecting processes can be defined: 
1. Develop the scenarios describing the critical emerging functions. 
2. Draw the resulting coupling matrix. 
3. Identify the sets of strongly coupled systems (by permuting the systems, so as transform 
the coupling matrix into a block-diagonal matrix, as described in [MEI02]). 
4. Once the critical sets are identified, adopt one or more of the following policies : 
• At least, each owner/manager of a component belonging to a critical set should be 
very cautious when designing a new version, and verify that interoperability is still 
ensured; 
• If it is possible, merge the management of the systems to ensure consistency of 
evolutions; 
• If it is possible, change the perimeter of the systems by merging them, from a 
technical point of view. 
 
When looking at this example, we observe a weak coupling between the ground firefighter 
squads and the other systems. This is due to autonomy needs and ad hoc and interactive 
interaction, because effectors are human and the environment evolves dynamically. On the 
contrary, the ground firefighter squads are linked to the mobile head quarter, so, if this mobile 
HQ evolves, that implies that ground firefighter squads evolve too. It is necessary to assess the 
impacts of the evolution of the former to the later. In this case, who is responsible for the 
evolutions of these systems? Who pays for them? 
 
If the customer systems do not evolve at the same level, there is an asynchronous evolution 
of the SoS and an increased risk as to SoS capabilities. Lack of compliance means lack of 
interoperability, whence loss of emergent capabilities of the SoS. The asynchronous evolution 
issue is very important since owners and managers of the various component systems are 
different, with strong aims and constraints upon the systems. To deal with this problem, an 
independent organization, such as a state or an agency, may impose a globally planned and 
orchestrated evolution, resolving such asynchronous evolution issues. The european project 
OASIS (Open Advanced System for dIsaster and emergency management, http://www.oasis-
fp6.org) is an example to resolve such an issue. The objective of OASIS is to define and develop 
an Information Technology framework based on an open and flexible architecture and using 
standards, existing or proposed by OASIS. That will be the basis of a European Disaster and 
Emergency Management system. 
 
Typically, when two systems are strongly coupled and exhibit weak coupling with the 
remaining systems, it could be appropriate to look at both systems globally and have a common 
organization level responsible for managing them. Such a question has its importance when 
addressing the communication infrastructure in a service-oriented architecture: who holds 
responsibility for this key asset of the SoS and manages its configuration, in adequacy with all 
other evolutions? A straightforward solution would be to have a contractor assuming integration 
responsibility for each subset of strongly coupled systems. Whether this can be applied to all 
problems is another question: on the one hand, it can be an advantage for Defense & Security 
SoS, or highly regulated SoS such as the air transportation and air traffic management SoS, but 
on the other hand it is an obvious barrier to spontaneous emergence of new behaviors. 
Coupling matrix, asynchronous evolution and failure mode 
definition 
The previous section hinted at how the coupling matrix could exhibit the impacts of 
asynchronous evolution, including emergent risks, as asynchronous evolution may degrade the 
whole SoS performance and safety. Indeed, as Levenson et al. [LEV06] write: “often, 
degradation of the control structure involves asynchronous evolution, where one part of a system 
changes without the related necessary changes in other parts. Changes to subsystems may be 
carefully designed, but consideration of their effects on other parts of the system, including the 
control aspects, may be neglected or inadequate”. Asynchronous evolution may trigger a failure 
of the interface between the related systems and imply by cascade effect a failure of the whole 
SoS. In this case, the new desired capabilities are not available, and worse, some critical 
component systems might have a failure that would not have occurred under stand-alone 
conditions. 
 
A formal verification procedure based on formal techniques cited before can provide a static 
failure analysis of the SoS. The dependence coupling matrix is a useful representation for this, as 
it enhances readability of the compositional behavior. However it does not give any answer 
concerning dynamic failure analysis, since the dynamic environment of a behavior during 
execution cannot be captured unfortunately by static descriptions. 
 
The only interesting answer, easily provided by our approach, is the search for a priori 
responsibilities between owners and managers in case of an identified failure. Indeed the 
incriminated service (either provided by a system, or arising as an emerging SoS service by 
combination of existing services) yields a set of potential responsible actors and resources, 
identified by reading the cells of the matrix. This raises the issue of responsibility transfers, 
which can be partially solved when an LSI (lead system integrator) or another appropriate risk-
sharing or risk-assuming entity is designated. Back to our example assuming the SoS emerging 
services are in place, that allows a “real-time” reassignment of the firefighting means following 
the weather monitoring and forecast. If the fire spreads, who should carry the responsibility… 
and the authority to decide actions? 
 
An indication of the “manageability” of a safe SoS could be the number of individual 
interactions involving two different owners, and therefore requiring the establishment of a 
contract. This is enlightened by colored cells in the following table.  
 
Table 4: Ownership and SoS service paths. 
1  
Fire 
brigade 
[1.1], [1.3] 
Internal 
 [1.2] , [1.4] 
Contract 
     
[2.1] 
Internal 
2 
Fire brigade 
 [2.3] 
Contract 
  [2.2] , [2.4] 
Contract 
  [2.4] 
Contract 
 [3.1] 
Contract 
3 
Civil ATM 
Office 
  [3.1] 
Contract
  [3.2]  
Contract 
 [4.4] 
Contract 
 4 
Local Civil 
Authority
  [4.2] , [4.3] 
Contract 
  
 [5.1] , [5.2] 
Internal 
  5 
Fire 
brigade
    
  [6.3] 
Contract 
  6 
Fire 
brigade
  [6.1] , [6.2] 
Contract 
 [7.1] 
Internal 
    7 
Fire 
brigade
  
[8.2] 
Contract 
 [8.2] 
Contract 
[8.2] 
Internal 
   8 
Local 
Civil 
Authority 
[8.2] 
Contract 
 [9.1] 
Contract 
[9.2] 
Contract 
     9 
Homeland 
security 
agency
 
This rather obvious remark should be correlated with the impact analysis mentioned before, 
which relies on the connectivity degree of the various services: integrators carrying the 
responsibility should be designated a priori for the services with the highest connectivity index. 
 
Further extensions: towards a dynamical view of SoS 
management 
Up to now we have dealt with static representations, isolating in time a specific view of the 
SoS. When addressing configuration management, a temporal analysis is more appropriate, 
especially for SoS which raise major agility issues: in that case each component (including the 
environment) is subject to radical changes in time that impact the whole SoS. This can occur at 
the (logical and physical) architecture level, at the mission level (evolving context of use and 
change of operating rules), at the organization level (vanishing and arising actors and/or 
contractors), etc. The instantaneous versions of the coupling matrix and its various enrichments 
can be assembled into a time-indexed bundle, and this new representation provides novel ways to 
tackle complex issues such as business strategic or acquisition issues: if system integrators are 
defined, their responsibility perimeter can be easily correlated to the evolution of the coupling 
within the SoS. For instance, the coloring mentioned in the previous section that helped seeing 
the connected business partners, defines in this higher-dimensional representation various 
colored subspaces (obtained by stacking the individual colored regions), which can be analyzed 
graphically very easily in terms of intertwining or connectivity. 
Although this may seem a little far-fetched, it is a research direction worth to pursue, 
especially when one remembers that sustainability of complex systems is currently critical, as it 
concentrates the major part of the budgetary resources of the life-cycle for systems, and that we 
lack tools to manage such issues. 
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